


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7 March 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet protests over West German military talks with Spain are a further step in campaign to isolate West Germany; recognition of East Germany by Guinea is first such recognition by non-Communist state. ①

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Afghan-Pakistani relations reach new low, with harassment of diplomatic representatives. ②

Sukarno dissolves Indonesian Parliament. ③



III. THE WEST

- ④ Second French nuclear test could occur as early as 14 March.
- ⑤ De Gaulle's call for military victory in Algeria not considered a policy reversal; he expects Algerians to choose autonomy.
- ⑥ Dominican Republic--Tension in church-state relations weakens Trujillo dictatorship.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

7 March 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK USSR-Germany: The Soviet notes of 4 March protesting West Germany's military talks with Spain are a further step in Moscow's campaign to isolate Bonn and portray Adenauer's policies as an increasingly serious obstacle to successful negotiations at the summit. Moscow's protests, timed to secure maximum impact prior to Khrushchev's visit to France beginning 15 March, are probably calculated to set the stage for an effort by the Soviet premier to convince De Gaulle that France and the USSR have a common interest in heading off a prospective German military threat. [REDACTED]

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OK Guinea's recognition of East Germany on 5 March, the first by a non-Communist state, will probably influence other uncommitted nations toward similar action; Bonn, which already has recalled its ambassador from Conakry, will attempt to discourage this trend, probably by breaking relations with Conakry or by imposing economic sanctions. In any event, this break in East Germany's diplomatic isolation will be welcomed by Moscow as strengthening its position at the summit. [REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO Afghanistan-Pakistan: [Afghanistan and Pakistan have begun to harass each others' diplomatic representatives, marking a new stage in the deterioration of their relations. If this harassment and their vitriolic propaganda continue, both may decide to withdraw ambassadors and reduce embassy staffs to the caretaker level.] [REDACTED]

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OK
Indonesia: Sukarno's abrupt dissolution of the Indonesian Parliament on 5 March in the interests of "guided democracy" apparently resulted from his irritation over the legislature's efforts to preserve its former power and his apprehension over possible parliamentary actions during his world tour beginning in early April. Sukarno plans to replace the present Parliament this year within the terms of the reinstituted 1945 constitution, which considerably strengthened the executive powers at the expense of the parliament. According to present plans, the next parliament--or people's congress--will include the approximately 260 members of the present body and some 290 regional and functional representatives to be appointed by Sukarno.

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III. THE WEST

France: [The second French nuclear test is now scheduled to take place "on or after 14 March,"

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NO
[redacted] Khrushchev's scheduled arrival in Paris on 15 March may have determined the choice of date for the second test. Earlier it had been reported planned before May and possibly within a month of the first.]

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NO
France-Algeria: De Gaulle's reported flat charge to the army in Algeria in early March to achieve an incontestable military victory over the rebels appears to indicate a determination to press for a solution without the "Provisional Algerian Government" if the rebels continue to pose conditions to cease-fire negotiations. While his speeches in southern France in late February emphasized that giving the Algerians free choice of their destiny is the only policy worthy of France, more recently in Algeria he has clearly stated his dislike of independence or integration with France.

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OK Dominican Republic: There is no prospect for an early improvement in the deteriorating church-state relations in the Dominican Republic, which have contributed to a serious weakening of the Trujillo dictatorship. The church leaders' demand for clemency for political prisoners has not been satisfied by Trujillo's 3 March statement. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Protests Bonn's Military Talks With Spain

The Soviet notes protesting West Germany's military talks with Spain, sent to the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany on 4 March, are designed to further Moscow's efforts to isolate Bonn diplomatically by stimulating and capitalizing on old antagonisms regarding the prospect of renewed Germany-Spanish military collaboration. Moscow recalls that Nazi Germany used Spanish territory during the civil war in a "rehearsal" for aggression in World War II, and accuses the Bonn government of seeking to work behind NATO's back in order to sidestep the remaining military restrictions on West Germany.

By timing the notes to secure a maximum impact prior to Khrushchev's visit to France beginning on 15 March, Soviet policymakers probably hope to set the stage for an appeal by Khrushchev to De Gaulle that the USSR and France have a common interest in heading off a prospective military threat from Germany. Commenting on the talks between Bonn and Madrid--"the two most reactionary regimes in Europe"--the Soviet press and radio have charged that German bases in Spain would be a "foothold in the back of France" and would threaten French and British strategic interests in the Mediterranean, especially Britain's base at Gibraltar.

Moscow's official protests are also calculated to give substance to Soviet charges that Adenauer's policies are an increasingly serious obstacle to a relaxation of tension and to successful negotiations at the summit.

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The arrival of Guinea's ambassador in East Berlin on 5 March marks the first instance of a non-Communist country recognizing East Germany. Unless Bonn reacts strongly, other uncommitted countries, including even some in Southeast Asia, where East German influence has recently been declining, may follow Guinea's lead. Other countries, including some in Western Europe, would almost certainly increase their relations with the USSR's German satellite, probably resulting eventually in some diplomatic exchanges. These developments would signify the breakdown of East Germany's diplomatic isolation and could strengthen considerably Khrushchev's hand in summit negotiations. The improvement of East Germany's international status would further Moscow's effort to impose East German participation in control of access to Berlin.

The Guinean action poses a crucial test for Bonn's policy--known as the "Hallstein doctrine"--of refusing to have diplomatic relations with any country other than the USSR that recognizes the East German regime. Bonn has recalled its ambassador from Conakry. Although the Foreign Ministry indicated that no further action would be taken until the ambassador reports, strong action appears certain if the basic policy of "one legitimate German Government" is to be maintained. Bonn broke relations with Yugoslavia in 1957 when Belgrade recognized East Germany, but no serious disruption occurred in West German - Yugoslav economic ties.

Guinea's move is in line with its increasingly close diplomatic and economic ties with the bloc and President Toure's willingness to do business with any nation friendly to Guinea. East Germany was one of the first states to recognize this new African republic in 1958 and has continued to maintain close economic relations with Conakry.

There is increasing evidence that Guinea is contemplating early establishment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam also. Two Vietnamese officials are already in Conakry, and Guinea's chief of protocol reportedly revealed recently that Conakry has agreed to the establishment of a North Vietnamese embassy.

[REDACTED]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Afghanistan and Pakistan Harass Each Others'
Diplomatic Representatives

[Afghanistan and Pakistan have begun to harass each others' diplomatic representatives, marking a new stage in the deterioration of their relations. In response to Kabul's Pushtoonistan propaganda campaign, Pakistan has increased the virulence of its own radiobroadcasts. Reacting strongly, Kabul recently put Pakistani diplomatic personnel under surveillance and arrested some of the embassy's local employees.]

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[If these tactics continue, as seems likely, both countries may decide to withdraw their ambassadors and reduce their embassy staffs to the caretaker level.]

[The Afghans are unlikely to back down in the face of increased Pakistani pressure. They apparently intend to insist that the two countries issue a joint statement that they are seeking a solution to their "political differences" as a precondition to a cessation of the Pushtoonistan propaganda campaign. The Pakistanis, however, feel this would amount to formal recognition of a legitimate interest on the part of Kabul in the relations between the Pushtoon citizens of Pakistan and the Pakistani Government. Accordingly, they refused in January to issue such a statement at the end of Afghan Foreign Minister Naim's talks with Pakistani President Ayub.]

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The Afghans have probably been strengthened in their stand by Soviet support. In the joint Afghan-Soviet communiqué issued on 5 March at the end of Khrushchev's four-day visit to Kabul, the Soviet premier endorsed the Afghan position that the Pushtoons should enjoy "self-determination," and on his return to Moscow publicly declared that "our sympathies in this question are. . .on the side of Afghanistan."

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III. THE WEST

De Gaulle Sifts Algerian Policy

De Gaulle in his recent statements to army elements in Algeria, seems to have surprised the ministers of the Debré government as much as the Paris press by the stress he put on a military victory over the rebels. While his remarks may have been aimed at impressing the rebels with the desirability of an early meeting to negotiate a cease-fire, he is more likely becoming convinced that rebel leaders are too sensitive to the demands of their troops to risk accepting his assurances that future elections in Algeria would actually be free.

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Nevertheless, his public statements in southern France just before he left for Algeria emphasized his view that "self-determination for the Algerians" can only mean their free choice to decide their destiny. In Algeria, however, he has ruled out as unthinkable that Algerians would choose either independence or integration with France.

He seems to be increasingly inclined to press ahead with the political evolution of Algeria regardless of the attitude of the Provisional Algerian Government.

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[Rebel Information Minister Yazid told an American official in Tunis on 5 March that his associates were not particularly worried by what they considered distorted press reports of De Gaulle's emphasis on pacification. He said no early rebel statement was planned, but that a period of watchful waiting was in prospect until De Gaulle's intentions become clearer.]

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There is no prospect for an immediate improvement in the deteriorating church-state relations in the Dominican Republic, which have contributed to a serious weakening of the Trujillo dictatorship. Responding to a pastoral letter which the six Catholic bishops had read at masses on 31 January, the dictator says he is "unable" to grant amnesty to the political prisoners accused of plotting against the regime. His reply, published on 3 March, was respectful in tone, however, and noted that sentences of some prisoners had been made lighter and that he had "requested" police officials to treat the prisoners "with the greatest spirit of rectitude."

The churchmen are reported unimpressed, and to feel that Trujillo's reply does not fulfill the pastoral letter's insistence on respect for human rights. Additional arrests have been made since the bishops' letter was read, and now probably more are imprisoned than the 1,500 admitted to an American official by the government in early February.

The American Embassy at Ciudad Trujillo has learned that prisoners are being moved from the capital to Barahona, Puerto Plata, and San Isidro, possibly as hostages to discourage attacks on military installations in those localities. The source fears that the prisoners may be in more danger of "systematic elimination" at these locations.

The excommunication of high officials, including the governor, in La Vega Province for attempting to interfere with the reading of the pastoral letter has further exacerbated church-state relations. Dissidents, heartened by the strong pastoral letter, will be further encouraged as news of the incident, unpublicized in the country, is spread by word of mouth.

The armed forces still give every indication of supporting Trujillo, although several relatives of high-ranking military officers have been identified among the dissidents. Dissidence appears to be spreading from the upper and professional classes to those of lower social strata.

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